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The Tallinn Papers

The NATO CCD COE’s Tallinn Papers are designed to inform strategic dialogue regarding cyber security within the Alliance and beyond. They address cyber security from a multidisciplinary perspective by examining a wide range of issues, including cyber threat assessment, domestic and international legal dilemmas, governance matters, assignment of roles and responsibilities for the cyber domain, the militarisation of cyberspace, and technical. Focussing on the most pressing cyber security debates, the Tallinn Papers aim to support the creation of a legal and policy architecture that is responsive to the peculiar challenges of cyberspace. With their future-looking approach, they seek to raise awareness and to provoke the critical thinking that is required for well-informed decision-making on the political and strategic levels.

Submissions

The Tallinn Papers is a peer reviewed publication of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. Although submissions are primarily commissioned by-invitation, proposals consistent with the annual theme and dealing with issues of strategic importance will be considered on an exceptional basis. Since the Tallinn Papers are meant for a wide audience, such proposals should assume no prior specialised knowledge on the part of the readership. Authors wishing to submit a proposal may contact the Editor-in-Chief at publications@ccdcoe.org.
The 2008 war between Georgia and Russia was predictably short, as Russian military might quickly trumped Georgian nationalist enthusiasm. Beyond its momentous geopolitical implications, it was the first war in which cyber activities loomed large; the conflict marked the public birth of “cyber war”, or at least cyber in war.\(^2\)

Cyber operations were not a completely new phenomenon. Most notably, they had played a significant geopolitical role in the previous year, when “hacktivists” around the world directed malicious cyber operations at NATO member Estonia following its movement of a Soviet-era statute commemorating the Great Patriotic War from central Tallinn to the outskirts of the capital.\(^3\) But this was not “war” in the traditional sense of two or more states engaged in armed hostilities against each other. In the Georgian case, by contrast, the cyber activities took place on belligerent territory during an armed conflict that involved classic kinetic military operations. Although civilians launched most of the attacks, and while they caused no physical damage or injury, there is no question that, unlike the events in Estonia the previous year, international humanitarian law (IHL, also known as the law of war, law of armed conflict and jus in bello) applied.

Cyber activities have become an indelible facet of contemporary warfare, not just for cyber-empowered militaries such as those of the United States, but also for low-tech forces. Terrorist and insurgent groups benefit from the use of the internet to recruit fighters and to finance operations. Social media is exploited for purposes that range from passing targeting information to directing the deployment of forces (the insurgent “flash mob”). Mobile phones are as much a part of the 21\(^{st}\) century kit bag as weapons, and email and texting have become

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3 Ibid, 14-34
pervasive means of military communication. The Arab Spring was a watershed in this regard, and cyber operations are ongoing in the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria. It is quite simply unimaginable that a contemporary conflict would not involve some manner of cyber operations, whether as simple as passing intelligence information using smart phones or as complicated as bringing down the enemy’s integrated air defence system.

In light of the role which cyber operations are playing in contemporary conflicts, attention must be paid to the law that governs these activities because, to borrow a sports analogy, a team that takes the field without knowing the rules is usually going to lose, even if it is the better team. International law, and particularly IHL, exerts a powerful influence on tactics, operational planning and strategic decision-making in modern warfare. The fight can be won on the battlefield but lost in the court of public and international opinion when one side appears to have acted outside the law. Given the novelty of cyber operations as a method of warfare during an armed conflict, any alleged misuse, even at the tactical level, has the potential for strategic consequences.

The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, based in Tallinn in Estonia, has taken the global lead in addressing this issue. In 2009, it launched a three-year project to examine the application of international law, especially that governing the use of force, to cyber operations. Over twenty distinguished legal scholars and government legal advisors came together to produce the *Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare*, a resource currently being expanded in the Centre’s “Tallinn 2.0” project.

Informed by the *Tallinn Manual* process, in which the author served as Director, this article examines IHL’s core norms – those governing targeting – as applied to cyber operations. It does so by following the legal logic applicable to virtually every targeting operation, from naval gunfire and air attack to special forces operations and space attacks. In each such case, those who plan, approve, and execute targeting missions have to ask the following questions:

1) What law applies to my operation?

2) May I engage the intended target?

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5 See https://ccdcoe.org/research.html

3) Is the weapon I want to use legal?

4) What precautions must I take to avoid collateral damage?

5) Do the scope and degree of likely collateral damage prohibit me from engaging the target?

There is now widespread agreement that international humanitarian law applies in its entirety to cyber operations conducted during an armed conflict.\textsuperscript{7} Thus, the questions set out above apply equally to targeting in the cyber context, albeit with a degree of interpretive creativity at times. This paper will explain how each is resolved with respect to cyber operations. The explanation is designed for policy-makers and operators who conduct, rely on, approve or are targeted by cyber operations. In the contemporary strategic environment, knowledge of the law applicable to cyber warfare is quite simply indispensable.

### The Applicable Law (Part I)

The threshold question in every targeting operation is whether the international humanitarian law rules even apply. IHL only comes into play when there is a war, technically known as an “armed conflict” in legal parlance. There are two forms of armed conflict, international and non-international. The former exists when hostilities break out between two or more countries,\textsuperscript{8} whereas the latter involves hostilities at a fairly high level between an organised armed group and a state or between two or more organised armed groups.\textsuperscript{9} For example, the use of force by Russia clearly created an international armed conflict with Ukraine, whereas the hostilities between Assad’s forces and those opposing his regime in Syria are non-international in character. Unless one of these two forms of armed


\textsuperscript{8} Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field, art 2, August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS 31; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art 2, August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS 85; Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art 2, August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS 135; Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art 2, Aug 12, 1949, 6 UST 3516, 75 UNTS 287

\textsuperscript{9} Ibid (all four conventions), art 3
conflict exists, IHL is inapplicable and human rights norms and domestic law serve as the core constraints on the targeting operation in question.

Whenever there is an armed conflict of either sort, IHL governs those cyber operations having a nexus with the conflict. To take a simple example, it is no less a violation of IHL, and a war crime, to conduct cyber operations intended to kill members of the civilian population than it is to bomb or shell them; the same law prohibiting direct attacks on civilians is breached. How that IHL rule applies is discussed below, but it is incontestable that it applies in its entirety to conflict-related cyber operations.

The somewhat more challenging legal question is whether cyber operations alone may qualify as armed conflicts to which IHL applies. In other words, if there is no armed conflict in the first place, can one begin as a result of cyber operations? If so, it becomes lawful to direct cyber and kinetic strikes against the armed forces and military objectives of the other state. To address this issue, it is necessary to distinguish between international and non-international armed conflict.

If there are two or more states involved, the first criterion for an international armed conflict is met. The second that hostilities have taken place, is somewhat ambiguous. Two questions present themselves in this regard. First, can cyber exchanges qualify as hostilities? It would seem logical that cyber operations that are qualitatively “attacks”, as the term is used in IHL, qualify as hostilities in the same way as kinetic attacks; they are operations causing damage or injury. After all, there is no normative or practical logic for distinguishing between a cyber operation that damages objects or injures people and a kinetic operation with precisely the same effects.

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10 On the topic generally, see Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Classification of Cyber Conflict’ 89 International Law Studies 233 (2013)

11 For each of the IHL norms, this article will cite: 1) the relevant treaty provision, although the US is not a party to that most often cited, Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions; 2) the ICRC’s Customary IHL study rule indicating the norm is customary in nature, i.e., binding on all states; 3) the relevant paragraph from the U.S. Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations; and 4) the applicable Tallinn Manual rule reflecting its application in the cyber context. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts [hereinafter Additional Protocol I], June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, art. 51(2); Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, eds (ICRC), Customary International Humanitarian Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), r 1; Department of the Navy and Department of Homeland Security, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations [hereinafter Commander’s Handbook], NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12/COMDTPUB P5800 7A, 2007, para 8 3; Tallinn Manual, r 32

12 Tallinn Manual, supra note 4, 82
However, whether cyber operations not qualifying as an attack under IHL may initiate an armed conflict remains unsettled. For instance, would cyber operations that result in a major loss of confidence in the stock market, a consequence far more serious than minor property damage or injury, qualify? Perhaps, as noted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “[i]t would appear that the answer to these questions will probably be determined in a definite manner only through future State practice.”

Second, is there any severity requirement for an attack, whether kinetic or cyber, that starts an international armed conflict? The quantitative threshold is unclear in law. It is sometimes argued that, for instance, minor exchanges of fire between the forces of two states do not rise to the level of an armed conflict. However, a better view is that which has been asserted by the ICRC for many years: “It makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, how much slaughter takes place, or how numerous are the participating forces.” This approach is, as lawyers say, more consistent with the “object and purpose” of IHL, since a state will want its civilians and civilian objects protected, and at the same time be able to use lethal force against the other side if hostilities break out.

Accordingly, an international armed conflict could begin based solely on cyber exchanges if two or more states were involved and the nature of the operations qualified them as attacks. To cite a well-known example, assuming that states conducted the 2010 Stuxnet operation, the damage arguably meant that Iran and those states were involved an international armed conflict, at least for the period during which the damaging acts were underway.

Cyber exchanges alone are far less likely to meet the two criteria for non-international armed conflict. First, the state must be facing an “organised armed group”. Although the legal preconditions for qualification as such are rather complicated, in the cyber context the pressing question is whether they are met by a group organised entirely online. Organised armed groups have to in some way be “commanded” and some degree of structure must exist that allows

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13 International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, supra note 7, 37
16 Prosecutor v. Tadić; Case No IT-94-1-L, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 70
their members to operate as a unit.\textsuperscript{17} It is also often suggested that “organisation” requires there to be a means to enforce IHL among the group.\textsuperscript{18} It is difficult to see how a virtual group in which members may not even know each other’s names or physical location could meet this condition.

Additionally, the group in question must be armed. The logic underlying the discussion of international \textit{armed} conflict would appear useful by analogy. “Armed” can be interpreted as a requirement for “hostilities”, which are acts that qualify as “attacks”. In the organised armed group context, therefore, an organised armed group is one that conducts kinetic or cyber attacks. Thus, a group that merely conducted non-destructive denial of service operations, for example, would not qualify. This is one reason why the operations against Estonia did not rise to the level of a non-international armed conflict. Those involved were acting in concert, but were not organised into a particular armed group or groups.

Second, and unlike international armed conflict, the violence associated with a non-international armed conflict must be protracted and must reach a high level of severity. It does not include “situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence, and other acts of a similar nature.”\textsuperscript{19} Even cyber operations causing death or destruction will sometimes not suffice. Neither would a single dramatic cyber operation such as a cyber terrorist attack qualify, even if causing harm far above this level, because it would not be protracted. In the simplest terms, the cyber conflict must start looking like a war. Turning again to the Estonian case, the hacktivist operations did not rise to this level because, despite widespread disruption of societal functions, there was no physical damage or injury.

Non-state actor cyber operations meeting these demanding criteria are currently unlikely. A more probable scenario is one in which cyber operations accompany kinetic ones and are governed by IHL on that basis. Therefore, when non-state

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Prosecutor v. Limaj}, Case No IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶ 89 (Int’l Crim Trib for the former Yugoslavia Nov 30, 2005)


\textsuperscript{19} Additional Protocol I, supra note 11, art 1(2) (the provision is generally characterised as reflecting customary law regarding qualification as a non-international armed conflict) See also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 UNTS 90, art 8 2(d)
actor cyber operations occur in isolation from kinetic attacks, they will typically be governed by the domestic law of states exercising jurisdiction over the person and the particular subject matter, as well as human rights law, but not by the IHL norms described below.

The Applicable Law (Part II)

Once it is determined that an armed conflict to which IHL applies is underway, the next step is to determine whether the law of targeting applies to the cyber operation in question.20 Doing so is more difficult than might appear at first glance. Indeed, the Tallinn Manual experts struggled with the subject for three years without reaching full consensus.

Any discussion of targeting begins with the principle of distinction, which is codified in Article 48 of the 1977 Additional Protocol to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions:

“The Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly direct their operations only against military objectives.”21

Although the United States is not a party to that instrument, it recognises Article 48 as reflective of customary international law,22 which binds all states.23 Indeed, the principle is arguably the most important in IHL, one that the International Court of Justice has labelled as one of the two “cardinal” principles of IHL.24

In international law circles, a major debate with particular resonance in the cyber context is whether the principle of distinction rules out all operations against objects and persons that do not qualify as military objectives, especially

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21 Additional Protocol I, supra note 11, art 48 See also Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 11, rr 1 and 7; Tallinn Manual, supra note 4, r 31
22 Commander’s Handbook, supra note 11, para 82;
23 Customary international law is a form of law unique to international law. It “crystallises” into a norm binding on all states once widespread state practice that is engaged in out of a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris) exists. Although unwritten, it is of equal legal force as treaty law. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat 1055, 33 UNTS 993, art 38
24 Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I C J 226, 78 (July 8)
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civilians and civilian objects. Textually, the article certainly appears to say as much, but such a conclusion would be both counter-intuitive and ahistorical. After all, military operations have been directed against civilian populations for centuries.

A closer look into Additional Protocol I reveals a series of prohibitions and restrictions on “attack” that operationalise the principle: *attacks* against civilians and civilian objects are prohibited, indiscriminate *attacks* are forbidden, parties to a conflict must take precautions to minimise civilian harm when planning and conducting *attacks*, a defender must take precautions to protect the civilian population against the effects of *attacks*, and so forth.25 Helpfully, “attacks” is defined in the Protocol as “acts of violence against the enemy, whether in offence or defence.”26 The characterisation of an attack as a violent act is repeated throughout the treaty27 and in ICRC and other commentaries thereon.28

It would seem, however, that the Protocol is inartfully worded. Violent *acts* are of less concern in IHL than violent *consequences*. This has been obvious for decades, the paradigmatic examples being the prohibitions on chemical, biological and radiological attacks, which are not violent in the sense of releasing kinetic force but have violent consequences, notably death. By the same logic, a cyber operation causing injury to persons or damage to objects is an attack subject to all the relevant IHL rules on attacks.29

But controversy surrounds the issue of whether the notion of attacks should be interpreted more broadly. A cyber operation targeting civilian cyber infrastructure (“communications, storage, and computing resources upon which information systems operate”30) without physical effects could be far more detrimental than one causing limited damage. Consider an attack during an armed conflict on the enemy’s banking, taxation, government pensions, or airline reservations systems. Critics of a restrictive interpretation argue that it seems incongruent to prohibit only the latter.

Two methods have surfaced that take account of this reality without having to either successfully negotiate new treaty terms (an unlikely eventuality)

25 Additional Protocol I, arts 51(2), 52(1), 57, 58; emphasis added
26 Ibid., art 49
27 See, e.g., Ibid., arts 35, 51(1), 51(2), 55, 56(1)
28 Additional Protocols Commentary, supra note 18, para 1875; Michael Bothe et al., New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts (Martinus Nijhoff, 1982) 289
29 Tallinn Manual, rule 30
30 Ibid., 258
or interpret the current law in a fashion that renders it unrecognisable. First, there are those who would interpret data as an object, such that an operation that manipulated, altered, or deleted civilian data would be prohibited.\(^\text{31}\) The conceptual problem is that the ICRC commentary to Additional Protocol I describes an object as something “tangible”,\(^\text{32}\) and data certainly is not that. Goal-oriented legal academics have proposed creative interpretation as a means of hurdling this particular obstacle, but fail to offer a viable practical alternative. If data is treated as an object, any operation that manipulates civilian data would qualify as “damage” (alteration of data) or “destruction” (deletion of data) of a “civilian object” and would thus be unlawful. As an example, deletion of a civilian’s forum or blog post would be a violation of IHL, as would non-destructive psychological cyber operations directed at the civilian population. Moreover, such an interpretation would dramatically affect application of the rule of proportionality and the requirement to take precautions in attack, both of which extend further protection to civilian objects.\(^\text{33}\) International humanitarian law is a careful balancing of humanitarian concerns with military necessity; simply styling data as an object would throw this balance out of kilter by barring operations that today are considered lawful in both their cyber and traditional guises.

The second approach, and the one adopted by a majority of the experts involved in the Tallinn Manual project, is to include “loss of functionality” in the concept of damage.\(^\text{34}\) By this, a cyber operation that affects the functionality of cyber infrastructure (from a laptop computer to a huge server farm or SCADA system) thus necessitating repair, qualifies as an attack even if no physical damage results. This approach makes sense, for it is fair to describe an item as damaged when it does not work; it is broken, even though it may not be physically damaged. Among the experts taking this position, there were various shades of opinion. Some were of the view that needing to reload the operating system satisfied the damage criterion. Others went so far as to say that cyber operations affecting data stored on the computer’s drives would suffice, although this was a minority view.

The implications of the majority positions set out above are significant. Unless

\(^{31}\) Tallinn Manual, 126

\(^{32}\) Additional Protocols Commentary, supra note 18, paras 2007-08


\(^{34}\) Tallinn Manual, supra note 4, 108-09
a cyber operation has consequences that at least affect the functionality of an object, it does not qualify as an attack and is therefore not prohibited. During an armed conflict, it is generally legal to conduct cyber operations directed against civilians and civilian objects, so long as they are not harmed or injured. To illustrate, it would be lawful to conduct denial of service attacks that blocked civilian e-services such as tax collection or the payment of pension benefits, but did not harm or affect the functionality of the associated cyber infrastructure, at least until the economic consequences became so severe that they began to have physical effects, such as starvation or illness. Similarly, by the majority approach, it is lawful to alter or destroy data so long as no consequences amounting to injury, physical damage or loss of functionality are manifest; examples could include government archives, birth or citizenship records, business records and market returns. Although such operations would raise serious moral, political, and social issues, they nevertheless appear lawful today.

**The Target**

Assuming that a cyber operation occurs during an armed conflict and qualifies as an attack as described above, the next hurdle is determining whether the target is a lawful one. Cyber operations most frequently implicate the prohibition on attacking civilian objects. In IHL, civilian objects are defined negatively as “all objects which are not military objectives.” Military objectives are “objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”

The equipment and facilities of the armed forces are military objectives by nature; a command-and-control facility and cyber infrastructure developed for specific military tasks both qualify, for example, on this basis. A particular location can also be a military objective, as when cyber means are used to open a dam’s gates to flood an area and deny its use to the enemy. Aside from military equipment, the most likely military objective in the cyber context is an object that qualifies by the “use” criterion; that is, one that was used or is still being used for civilian purposes, but is now being employed, at least in part, for military ends. It should

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35 Additional Protocol I, supra note 11, art 52(1) See also Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 11, r 9; Commander’s Handbook, supra note 11, para 8 3; Tallinn Manual, supra note 4, r 38

36 Additional Protocol I, supra note 11, art 52(1) See also Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 11, r 8; Commander’s Handbook, supra note 11, para 8 2; Tallinn Manual, supra note 4, r 38
be cautioned that a rule of reason holds when applying this criterion to cyber activities. For instance, the mere fact that the military sends email over the internet does not render the entire internet a lawful target. Finally, a civilian object can become a military objective through purpose, which refers to the intended future use of an object. For example, if there is reliable intelligence that a civilian server farm will soon begin to store military data, the server farm is a military objective that may be attacked even before data storage begins.

These definitions do not present any particular problems in the cyber setting. However, it must be acknowledged that the pervasive use of civilian cyber infrastructure for military purposes has transformed much of it into valid military objectives. When an object is used for both civilian and military purposes, it is labelled “dual-use”. In targeting terms, this is so whether something is exclusively used for military purposes, is shared by civilian and military users, or is only used to a limited degree by the military, it qualifies as a targetable military objective. The civilian aspects of the target are relevant to the requirements for proportionality and precautions in attack requirements as described below, but civilian use does not diminish its qualification as a military objective.

To take a simple example, many air traffic control and airspace management systems serve both civilian and military aircraft. When this is the case, they are military objectives irrespective of the extent of civilian reliance on them. The communications lines to which the systems are connected are also dual-use, and so they too qualify as military objectives, as do any routers involved and any servers on which their data is stored. The harsh reality of 21st century military cyber activity is that the heavy reliance on civilian products and infrastructure dramatically expands the universe of targetable objects, including systems on which important civilian functions rely.

The introduction of cyber capabilities into contemporary combat has also exacerbated a long-standing debate over the notion of military objectives. All states and legal commentators agree that the term encompasses so-called “war-fighting” and “war-supporting” objects. The former are those used to conduct military operations, whereas the latter include objects on which military operations rely in some relatively direct sense, such as factories that make munitions, weapons or equipment (including computer equipment) used by the military, even when they also produce civilian products. They may not necessarily be attacked, because of the operation of the rule of proportionality and the requirement to take precautions in attack, but they unquestionably qualify as military objectives. What is especially significant with regard to the war-supporting category in the cyber context is the extent to which the
dependency of the armed forces on civilian products and infrastructure not only makes the objects in question legally targetable, but also the facilities that produce them.

However, a third category, “war-sustaining” objects, has generated widespread controversy. The US Navy’s *Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*, the most current US manual addressing international humanitarian law, labels enemy “war-sustaining” objects as military objectives susceptible to lawful attack.37 An annotated version of the *Handbook* offers the example of cotton during the Civil War.38 But for the export of cotton, the Confederate States would have been unable to finance their war effort and cotton exports sustained the war. Therefore, according to this approach, that industry was rendered lawfully targetable. The contemporary analogue would be those aspects of an economy or governmental financial system upon which the enemy relies in order to fund participation in the conflict. An obvious example are the oil industries of countries that depend heavily on oil exports for funding; although the United States has never developed the concept with any granularity, other examples might also include the tax systems, financial systems, transport network, and the like.

The significance of this approach cannot be overstated when applied to the cyber environment. Many war sustaining targets cannot be struck kinetically in a fashion that would generate the same effects as cyber attacks. Consider the banking system. While kinetic attacks against banks would be highly disruptive, given the limitations of kinetic weaponry and the number of potential targets falling into this category, creating strategic effects capable of undermining the sustainability of the war effort is unlikely. However, cyber attacks that would, for instance, render the cyber infrastructure upon which the banking system relies dysfunctional could bring the entire system down. Indeed, the operations need not even rise to the level of an attack as described above. Cyber operations that either deleted funds from accounts or began to change account balances would trigger, for example a collapse of confidence in the banking system that would cause transactions to grind to a halt. While the war-sustaining debate previously loomed large, the ability of cyber operations to make war-sustaining attacks possible and effective at the operational and strategic level will probably reinvigorate the debate. This is especially so in light of the fact that very few states have openly embraced the US approach, thereby rendering the world’s

37 *Commander’s Handbook*, supra note 11, para. 8 2
38 A R Thomas and James C. Duncan (eds.), *Annotated Supplement to the Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations* (Naval War College Press, 1999), 403
most cyber empowered military as an outlier on the matter.

In addition to objects, “persons” may qualify as lawful targets. It is, of course, possible to attack people by cyber means, for instance, by starting fires in facilities in which they are located, interfering with air traffic control relied upon by the aircraft transporting them, causing train collisions, and so forth. Additionally, individuals involved in cyber operations may be targeted kinetically once they have been identified and located. The issues are which people are targetable as a matter of law, and when may they be targeted.

Obviously, members of the armed forces who conduct cyber operations are always targetable (unless hors de combat); they are combatants.39 The rules regarding when civilians may be targeted are far more complex. To address this, the International Committee of the Red Cross sponsored a five-year research study between 2003 and 2008 involving a group of 40 international experts.40 The experts agreed that members of an organised armed group, as defined above, are targetable while they are members of the group.41 They disagreed, however, over precisely which members of the group were targetable. The ICRC was of the position that only those with a “continuous combat function” could be attacked. Such functions encompass roles in the group that involve activities likely to adversely affect the enemy.42 Some individual participants in the project countered that all members of a group formed to conduct hostilities (or the members of the armed wing of a group that includes other functions, such as Hamas) could be attacked, a position that appears to be favoured by the United States, Israel and other countries with significant combat experience.43

Applied to cyber, the approaches taken to direct participation lead in different directions. Take an organised armed group that conducts kinetic hostilities, but also has “cyber operators”. All those who conduct cyber operations against the

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39 Additional Protocol I, supra note 11, art 50(1) and 51(2); Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 11, r 1; Commander’s Handbook, supra note 11, para 8 2 1; Tallinn Manual, supra note 4, r 34
42 Interpretive Guidance, supra note 40, 71
enemy or who defend against the enemy’s operations have a continuous combat
function and therefore would be targetable by either approach. Other members
may have cyber-related duties, such as maintaining propaganda websites or
recruiting members. By the ICRC approach, they do not have a continuous
combat function and therefore would not be targetable unless they assume such
a function within the group. By the alternative approach, they could be attacked
at any time, based on their membership of the group.

Individuals unaffiliated with an organised armed group, or, in the ICRC
approach, who do not have a continuous combat function in such a group, are
only targetable “for such time” as they “take a direct part in hostilities”.44 An act
is direct participation when it meets three criteria.45 First, it must adversely affect
the military operations or military capability of one of the parties to the conflict,
or injure or damage persons or objects protected by IHL, such as civilians and
civilian objects.46 It is important to understand that this does not require that the
activity qualify as an attack. As an example, gathering and disseminating tactical
and operational level intelligence by cyber means suffices, as does probing
enemy systems in order to identify vulnerabilities.

Second, the qualifying activity must directly cause the harm or be an integral
component of the operation that does so.47 There has been some controversy
over this requirement with respect to the production of improvised explosive
devices and serving as a voluntary human shield. Although both activities are
sometimes characterised as indirect, the better position is that causal nexus
between such activities and harm to the enemy is sufficiently direct.48 The cyber
analogue would be the development of software specific to an attack on the
enemy system or allowing cyber operations to be launched from one’s home or
business by others. One thing that all parties agree on is that factory workers
do not qualify as direct participants in hostilities. This being so, individuals
involved in the production of cyber infrastructure and equipment, or its general
(as distinct from operational) maintenance are not targetable direct participants,

44 Additional Protocol I, supra note 11, art 51(3); Additional Protocol II, supra note 18, art 13(3);
Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 11, r 6; Commander’s Handbook, supra note 11,
para 8 2 2; Tallinn Manual, supra note 4, r 35
45 See generally Michael N Schmitt, ‘Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The
46 Interpretive Guidance, supra note 40, 47
47 Ibid, 51
48 See Interpretive Guidance, supra note 40, 53-54, 56-57; Michael N Schmitt, ‘Deconstructing Direct
Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive Elements,’ 42 New York Journal of International Law
although the *facilities* in which they operate will qualify as military targets by virtue of their use.

The third requirement is that there be a nexus between the activity and the conflict.\(^49\) In other words, the activity must be related to the on-going conflict as distinct from being an act of criminality or mere maliciousness. Although sometimes difficult to discern, the experts are in accord on this criterion.

It is difficult to overstate the importance of the direct participation rules in the cyber context. The Georgia-Russia armed conflict, as well as subsequent ones, demonstrate that the civilian population is highly likely to become involved in the cyber aspects of the conflict. For instance, in the Georgia case, a website (“StopGeorgia.ru”) containing cyber targets and downloadable malware necessary to conduct cyber operations appeared online soon after the launch of kinetic operations.\(^50\) The site proved effective in enabling cyber operations by civilians against Georgian military and civilian cyber targets. As this example illustrates, it is far easier to “cyber arm” a civilian population than to do so with traditional weaponry. Additionally, many individuals have the know-how to conduct harmful cyber operations; all they require is connectivity to begin participating in the hostilities themselves and share their knowledge with other potential direct participants.

To compound matters, the scope of activities constituting the direct participation in hostilities is broad. Conducting a simple denial-of-service operation, building a botnet for use against the enemy, or texting to transmit visual sighting of enemy forces would all qualify as direct participation that justifies lethally attacking the person involved. As should be apparent, the direct participation rule means the pool of targetable individuals could be extremely large in future conflicts, far more than is the case in classic conflict.

That said, one possible obstacle to far-reaching application of the rule is that a direct participant is only targetable “for such time” as he or she is so participating.\(^51\) The ICRC has suggested that this period includes measures preparatory to a specific act of direct participation, as well as deployment to and return from the activity concerned.\(^52\) This is a rather impractical standard in the cyber context. Except for close-access operations (those involving in-

\(^{49}\) *Interpretive Guidance*, *supra* note 40, 58

\(^{50}\) Tikk, Kaska and Vihul, *supra* note 2, 73

\(^{51}\) See generally Bill Boothby, “And for Such Time As”: The Time Dimension to Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 *New York Journal of International Law and Politics* 741 (2010)

\(^{52}\) *Interpretive Guidance*, *supra* note 40, 69-73
person manipulation of cyber infrastructure), there is usually no deployment to
and from a cyber operation; they are conducted remotely. Thus, by the ICRC
approach, the direct participant would have to be caught in the act, a standard
that dramatically narrows the window of targetability. Further rendering
this position impracticable is the fact that cyber operations can be very brief,
sometimes so brief that an attacker cannot be identified to the level of reasonable
confidence before the operation is over. Therefore, the better approach is to
characterise an individual who engages in multiple cyber operations that are part
of an on-going cyber campaign as a direct participant targetable throughout the
period of activity. Once the individual definitively withdraws from participation,
he or she regains their protection from attack, and not before.53

The Weapon

While certain uses of cyber weapons (malware) violate IHL, such as “attacking”
civilians, cyber weapons may also be unlawful \textit{per se}; that is, irrespective of
actual use. The prohibition most relevant in this regard is that on indiscriminate
means (weapons).54 Weapons are prohibited when they 1) cannot be directed
at a specific military objective or 2) generate uncontrollable effects. In both
cases, the weapons are indiscriminate in the sense that they are incapable of
distinguishing between combatants and civilians or civilian objects and military
objectives. The paradigmatic example of the former is the V2 rocket used during
World War II, which had a guidance system that was so rudimentary that it could
not be reliably aimed at individual military objectives. Biological contagions
illustrate the latter, because an attacker employing them cannot control their
spread from human to human.

Cyber weapons may at times run afoul of these prohibitions. For example,
consider malware intended for use against military cyber infrastructure linked to
civilian networks. If the malware is designed to spread randomly throughout the
system into which it is introduced, it is indiscriminate by nature and prohibited
\textit{per se}. Similarly, malware developed for placement on a website that is open to
civilians and combatants alike would qualify as indiscriminate irrespective of
any desire on the part of its user to affect only military systems. Perhaps the

53 Other aspects of international law may also limit the targetability of an individual For
instance, the law of neutrality will generally bar conducting operations against a person located
on neutral territory \textit{Tallinn Manual, supra} note 4, rr 91-94
54 Additional Protocol I, \textit{supra} note 11, art 51(4)(b) and (c); \textit{Customary International Humanitarian
Law, supra} note 11, r 71; \textit{Commander’s Handbook, supra} note 11, para 912; \textit{Tallinn Manual, supra}
ote 4, rule 43
most well-known indiscriminate cyber weapon is the malicious but seemingly innocuous email attachment sent to a combatant’s private email account. Since the attacker has no control over to whom it might be forwarded, the email, depending on its apparent nature (e.g., a humorous email likely to be forwarded), would be indiscriminate.

It must be cautioned that the restrictions on indiscriminate weapons only apply when the cyber weapon in question is used to conduct attacks. They do not bear on malware that does not cause injury, damage or loss of system functionality. For instance, an email attachment that when opened simply enables future access by the sender would not be unlawful under IHL even though the sender might not be able to control its further spread into civilian systems.

Because of this, as well as the fact that advanced cyber weapons likely to be used by states in armed conflict are by nature designed to exploit particular vulnerabilities in specific systems, few cyber weapons violate the prohibition on indiscriminate weapons. Cyber weapons can be employed against closed military systems in which the risk of bleed-over into civilian networks is low. Of course, there is always some risk of unintentional or unanticipated migration into civilian systems, as illustrated by the Stuxnet malware that, contrary to the intent of its designers, escaped the nuclear enrichment plant. Yet, the risk of malfunction or unanticipated effects is a pervasive feature of weaponry writ large; only when the weapon is incapable of being aimed or controlled is it prohibited as indiscriminate.

**Precautions to Avoid Civilian Harm**

Even when employing a lawful cyber weapon against a lawful target, an attacker must take “constant care” to “spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.” To achieve this, the law specifies a number of precautionary measures. The attacker must do everything feasible to verify that the target is not protected by IHL, select the weapon, tactic, and target that will minimise civilian harm without forfeiting military advantage; cancel or suspend an attack when reason

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55 Additional Protocol I, supra note 11, art 57(1); Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 11, r. 15; Commander’s Handbook, supra note 11, para. 81; Tallinn Manual, supra note 4, r. 52

56 Additional Protocol I, supra note 11, art 57(2)(a)(i); Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 11, r. 16; Tallinn Manual, supra note 4, r. 53

57 Additional Protocol I, supra note 11, art 57(2)(a)(ii) and 57(3); Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 11, r. 17 and 21; Tallinn Manual, supra note 4, rr. 54 and 56
to believe that the attack may be unlawful comes to light;\textsuperscript{58} and warn the civilian population of any attack that may affect them, unless doing so would not be feasible in the circumstances.\textsuperscript{59}

Cyber capabilities raise a number of issues in this regard. They can, for example, be used to gather target information. If doing so would improve knowledge as to the target’s legal status (and it is militarily feasible in the circumstances given such factors as attack timing and competing demands for the cyber asset), the attacker must undertake the effort. Cyber operations may also provide a means of issuing warnings to the civilian population of both cyber and kinetic attack. For instance, general warnings of attack could be transmitted through civilian systems networked to military cyber infrastructure urging measures to be taken to safeguard them from the effects of attack on the military objectives.

However, the most significant impact of the precautions in attack rules lies in the requirement to consider alternative weapons, tactics and targets in order to minimise civilian incidental harm. To illustrate, it may be possible to neutralise an integrated air defence system by cyber means instead of conducting kinetic attacks against its assorted components. Since cyber operations would in most cases be less likely to cause collateral damage, they would be required by law in lieu of kinetic alternatives, if feasible and militarily sensible. Cyber operations may also open the possibility of striking different targets in order to achieve a desired effect. As an example, in order to disrupt enemy operations, it may be possible to use cyber assets against communications infrastructure serving a command-and-control facility located near civilians, rather than attacking the facility itself, and achieve precisely the desired effect. Indeed, it could prove useful to preserve the facility in order to subsequently exploit it by using cyber means to transmit false instructions and other information to the enemy forces.

It must be emphasised that the precautions in attack rule regarding selection of weapons, tactics and targets is obligatory. If cyber means are reasonably available, their use makes military sense in the circumstances, and their employment would not diminish the likelihood of operational success, the attacking force must use them. Failure to do so will violate the law. It is accordingly prudent for those who plan, approve and execute military operations to have ready access to cyber expertise that apprise them of cyber options. Ignorance is not an excuse

\textsuperscript{58} Additional Protocol I, \textit{supra} note 11, art 57(2)(b); \textit{Customary International Humanitarian Law}, \textit{supra} note 11, r 19; \textit{Tallinn Manual}, \textit{supra} note 4, r 57

\textsuperscript{59} Additional Protocol I, \textit{supra} note 11, art 57(2)(c); \textit{Customary International Humanitarian Law}, \textit{supra} note 11, r 20; \textit{Tallinn Manual}, \textit{supra} note 4, r 58
for failure to comply with the rule in situations where the individual concerned should have known that a cyber operation was feasible in the circumstances and would likely have resulted in less collateral damage.

**Collateral Damage**

Once the attacker has surveyed the range of possible operations to achieve the desired effects and selected that viable alternative which best minimises collateral damage, the operation is assessed against the rule of proportionality. This rule provides that “an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated,” is prohibited.60

Two mistakes have proven common when applying the rule of proportionality. First, the rule is often mischaracterised as a balancing test in which military advantage and collateral damage are somehow accorded values that presumably can be compared. Not only is it difficult to imagine how this could be done in practice, but portraying proportionality as a balancing test runs counter to the plain text of the rule, which only precludes an attack when the collateral damage is “excessive”. Excessive refers to a “significant imbalance”,61 one in which it is reasonably clear that causing the expected degree of collateral damage is not justified by the military advantage the attacker hopes to attain. Since cyber operations can generate effects that are not typically present in warfare, and therefore somewhat unfamiliar, fidelity to the excessive standard is essential as it affords the attacker the correct degree of discretion.

Second, the rule is unfortunately often applied post factum. However, as is clear from its text, the proportionality assessment is made ex ante. Expected collateral damage is assessed against the anticipated military advantage. The actual collateral damage caused and the military advantage that actually results are relevant to evaluating the reasonableness of the attacker's pre-attack proportionality assessment, but are not dispositive as to whether the attacker has satisfied the rule of proportionality. This is again an important point in the cyber context because of the widespread linkage of civilian and military systems.

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60 Additional Protocol I, supra note 11, art 57(2)(a)(iii) and 57(2)(b); Customary International Humanitarian Law, supra note 11, r 14; Commander's Handbook, supra note 11, para 8 3 1; Tallinn Manual, supra note 4, r 51

and the difficulty an attacker may face in evaluating potential effects at the time the cyber mission is planned, approved or executed.

With respect to the substantive aspects of proportionality, cyber operations can serve to minimise collateral damage and therefore make compliance with the rule more likely. The networked nature of cyber infrastructure, however, heightens the risk of indirect effects on civilian systems. This is particularly true in light of the wide-ranging reliance of the military on dual use cyber systems. To the extent to which indirect effects are foreseeable, they must be considered when making proportionality calculations. That said, the proportionality rule, like the prohibition on weapons generating uncontrollable effects, only requires the consideration of “loss of civilian life, injury to civilians” and “damage to civilian objects”. Other indirect effects of a cyber operation on civilians, civilian objects and other persons and objects protected by IHL are not factored into the equation.

**Conclusion**

Cyber operations appeared on the battlefield in a dangerous interpretive void. As so often happens, technology has outpaced the law, or at least full understanding of how extant law governs emerging cyber capabilities. This state of affairs is always strategically perilous. On the one hand, options that are in fact lawful are sometimes needlessly taken off the table out of misguided concern as to their legality. On the other, unlawful options are at times seriously considered, thereby risking public and international condemnation should they be selected.

The normative fog of cyber war is beginning to clear, albeit slowly. This article has surveyed those aspects of international humanitarian law relevant to targeting, the activity during an armed conflict that poses the greatest risk to the defender and the civilian population. But targeting equally poses the greatest risk to the attacker, not only from an operational perspective, but also in terms of mission accomplishment. Characterisation of a cyber operation as unlawful can quickly wipe away any gains which the operation has attained. It is accordingly essential that those occupying roles have responsibility for overseeing and executing cyber operations develop a degree of understanding as to their normative boundaries.