

Is the International Law of Cyber Security in Crisis?

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Abstract: Several indicators suggest that the international law of cyber security is in the midst of a crisis. First, proposals of internationally binding treaties by the leading stakeholders, including Russia and China, have been met with little enthusiasm by other states, and are generally seen as having limited prospects of success. Second, states are extremely reluctant to commit themselves to specific interpretations of the controversial legal questions and thus to express their *opinio juris*. Third, instead of interpreting or developing rules, state representatives seek refuge in the vacuous term ‘norms’. This paper argues that the reluctance of states to engage themselves in international law-making has generated a power vacuum, lending credence to claims that international law fails in addressing modern challenges posed by the rapid development of information and communication technologies. In response, a number of non-state-driven norm-making initiatives have sought to fill this vacuum, such as Microsoft’s cyber norms proposal or the *Tallinn Manual* project. The paper then contends that this emerging body of non-binding norms presents states with a critical window of opportunity to reclaim a central law-making position, similarly to historical precedents including the development of legal regimes for Antarctica and nuclear safety. Whether the supposed crisis of international law will lead to the demise of inter-state governance of cyberspace or the recalibration of legal approaches will thus be decided in the near future. States should assume a central role in the process if they want to ensure that the existing power vacuum is not exploited in a way that would upset their ability to achieve their strategic and political goals.

Keywords: *attribution, cyber security, governance, international law, international norms, power*

1. INTRODUCTION

None of the global challenges facing the modern international community can be adequately addressed by any single international actor, irrespective of how powerful that actor may be. Whether one thinks of climate change, international terrorism, or cyber threats, all such challenging contemporary phenomena necessitate a framework for international co-operation. It is international law that ‘affords [such] a framework, a pattern, a fabric for international society’.¹

By establishing a framework of constraints, the law simultaneously guarantees a sphere of autonomy for its subjects.² In the context of international law, legal norms lay down shared boundaries of acceptable conduct in international relations, while preserving important space for manoeuvre, discretion and negotiation. This is the idea at the root of the famous ‘*Lotus* presumption’,³ according to which states may generally act freely unless prevented by a contrary rule of international law.⁴

In order to delineate this zone of freedom for states and other international actors with respect to a new phenomenon of international significance, it is necessary to identify, interpret and apply relevant legal rules to it.⁵ Cyberspace, broadly understood, is precisely such a phenomenon. Crucially, the uses and abuses of this complex borderless virtual space impinge on vital state interests in the physical world, including national security, public safety, or economic development. As such, cyberspace extends far beyond the domain of internal affairs of any state.⁶

Yet, with respect to the management of cyberspace, it may appear that international law fails to deliver. Although the main building blocks of the Internet’s architecture were laid over two decades ago,⁷ it took until 2013 for state representatives to agree on the rudimentary threshold assumption that international law actually applies to cyberspace.⁸

Although that agreement was touted at the time as a ‘landmark consensus’,⁹ its actual import is controversial. It was expressed in the form of a non-binding report of a Group of Government

¹ Louis Henkin, *How Nations Behave* (2nd edn, Columbia University Press 1978) 5.

² Cf Joseph Raz, *The Morality of Freedom* (Clarendon Press 1986) 155 (‘Autonomy is possible only within a framework of constraints.’).

³ See, e.g. James Crawford, *The Creation of States in International Law* (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 41–42 (describing the presumption as a ‘part of the hidden grammar of international legal language’).

⁴ PCIJ, *Lotus Case (France v Turkey)* (Merits) [1927] PCIJ Rep Series A No 10, 18.

⁵ Cf Gennady M Danilenko, *Law-Making in the International Community* (Martinus Nijhoff 1993) 1 (arguing that in order for the international legal system to remain effective, it needs to engage in (1) law-making in novel, so far ungoverned areas and (2) constant upgrading and refinement of the existing law).

⁶ See also Henry H Perritt, ‘The Internet as a Threat to Sovereignty? Thoughts on the Internet’s Role in Strengthening National and Global Governance’ (1998) 5(2) *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* 423, 429; Katharina Ziolkowski, *Confidence Building Measures for Cyberspace: Legal Implications* (NATO CCD COE 2013) 165.

⁷ Tim Berners-Lee, ‘Information Management: A Proposal’, Internal Memo (CERN, March 1989), <<http://cds.cern.ch/record/1405411/files/ARCH-WWW-4-010.pdf>>. All Internet resources were accessed on 7 March 2016.

⁸ Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, UN Doc A/68/98 (24 June 2013) (‘GGE Report 2013’) 8 [19].

⁹ United States, Department of State, ‘Statement on Consensus Achieved by the UN Group of Governmental Experts On Cyber Issues’ (7 June 2013) <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/06/210418.htm>>.

Experts (GGE) established by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly.¹⁰ At the time, the group was composed of representatives of 15 UN member states,¹¹ including the three ‘cyber superpowers’ China, Russia, and the United States.¹² Its position can thus perhaps be taken as confirming a shared understanding in the international community.¹³

Still, the report poses more questions than it answers. International law is supposed to apply, but *which* international law? Although the group endorsed the centrality of the UN Charter,¹⁴ several of its members have questioned the applicability of a prominent subdomain of international law – the law of armed conflict – to cyber operations.¹⁵ Perhaps more importantly, *how* is international law supposed to apply? It is one thing to know that the online realm is not a lawless world, but quite another to understand how its rules precisely apply to cyber phenomena.¹⁶

Against this background, this paper examines if the current situation is fairly described as one of crisis. To that end, it weighs three key crisis indicators reverberating around states’ general reluctance to engage in law-making in the area of the international law of cyber security¹⁷ (section 2). Since new binding rules are few and far between, it then looks to the pre-existing landscape of international law and the extent to which it provides a regulatory mechanism in its own right (section 3). Subsequently, the paper shows that states’ retreat from their traditional legislative role has generated a power vacuum (section 4), triggering a number of non-state initiatives seeking to fill it (section 5). On the basis of historical precedents that include the development of legal regimes for Antarctica and nuclear safety, the paper then argues that states now have a critical window of opportunity to build on the plurality of emerging non-binding norms and thus reclaim their central law-making position (section 6). Whether they succeed in doing so and in what way will determine the answer to the overarching question of this paper.

2. CRISIS INDICATORS

Three indicators of the apparent crisis of international law stand out. First, the area of cyber security appears resistant to codification of the applicable rules in a comprehensive multilateral

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid 12-13.

¹² See, e.g. Adam Segal, *The Hacked World Order* (Public Affairs 2016) 40.

¹³ The UN General Assembly subsequently ‘[w]elcom[ed]’ the GGE report in a unanimously adopted resolution without, however, discussing the details of its contents. See UN GA Res 68/243 (9 January 2014) preambular para 11.

¹⁴ GGE Report 2013 (n 8) 8 [19] (‘International law, and in particular the Charter of the United Nations, is applicable’) (emphasis added).

¹⁵ See, e.g., US, Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China* (2011) 6 (‘China has not yet agreed with the U.S. position that existing mechanisms, such as International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, apply in cyberspace.’); Elena Chernenko, ‘Russia Warns Against NATO Document Legitimizing Cyberwars’ *Kommersant-Vlast* (29 May 2013) <http://rbth.com/international/2013/05/29/russia_warns_against_nato_document_legitimizing_cyberwars_26483.html> (reporting the Russian government’s scepticism of the *Tallinn Manual*’s endorsement of the applicability of international humanitarian law to cyberspace).

¹⁶ See also Anna-Maria Osula and Henry Rõigas, ‘Introduction’ in Anna-Maria Osula and Henry Rõigas (eds), *International Cyber Norms: Legal, Policy & Industry Perspectives* (NATO CCD COE 2016) 14.

¹⁷ The term ‘international law of cyber security’, as understood in this paper, refers to an emerging legal discipline and a body of law that concerns the rights and obligations of states regarding cyber security.

binding treaty.¹⁸ This is not for want of trying by the leading international stakeholders. Already in 1996, France put forward the earliest proposal with the lofty title *Charter for International Cooperation on the Internet*.¹⁹ Later, a joint Russo-Chinese initiative resulted in two proposals for a *Code of Conduct for Information Security*, submitted to the UN General Assembly in 2011 and 2015, respectively.²⁰ However, none of these proposals was met with much enthusiasm by other states²¹ and scholars describe the prospects of an ‘omnibus’ treaty being adopted in the near future as slim to negligible.²²

Second, states have shown extreme reluctance to contribute towards the development of cyber-specific customary international rules. In addition to state practice in this area being inevitably shrouded in secrecy,²³ states have been reluctant to offer clear expressions of *opinio juris* on matters related to cyber security.²⁴ At times, this approach may certainly be understandable, being the consequence of a domestic political gridlock or even a deliberate waiting strategy.²⁵ On the whole, however, it adds to the pervasive ambiguity as far as the specific applicability of international law is concerned. This trend is visible even in the most recent developments. A representative example of another missed opportunity to steer the development of cyber custom is provided by the new United States (US) *Law of War Manual* adopted in July 2015.²⁶ Although it does contain a chapter on cyber operations,²⁷ the Manual skirts virtually all of the

- 18 For existing sectoral and regional treaties concerning aspects of cyber security, see text to notes 40–49 below.
- 19 Timothy S Wu, ‘Cyberspace Sovereignty? The Internet and the International System’ (1997) 10(3) *Harvard Journal of Law & Technology* 647, 660. The initiative was reportedly supposed to ‘lead to an accord comparable to the international law of the sea, which governs the world’s oceans’. ‘France Seeks Global Internet Rules’, *Reuters News Service* (31 January 1996) <<http://dasalte.ccc.de/crd/CRD19960205.html>>.
- 20 Letter dated 12 September 2011 from the Permanent Representatives of China, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/66/359 (14 September 2011) 3–5; Letter dated 9 January 2015 from the Permanent Representatives of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc 69/723 (13 January 2015) 3–6.
- 21 See, e.g., United Kingdom, Response to General Assembly resolution 68/243 ‘Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security’ (May 2014) <<https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/UK.pdf>> 5 (noting that ‘attempts to conclude comprehensive multilateral treaties, codes of conduct or similar instruments would [not] make a positive contribution to enhanced international cybersecurity’); Marina Kaljurand, ‘United Nations Group of Governmental Experts: The Estonian Perspective’ in Osula and Rõigas (n 16) 123 (stating that ‘starting negotiations on the draft Code of Conduct ... would be premature’).
- 22 See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, ‘Cybersecurity Treaties: A Skeptical View’ in Peter Berkowitz (ed), *Future Challenges in National Security and Law* (Hoover Institution Press 2011) 12; Matthew C Waxman, ‘Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article 2(4)’ (2011) 36 *Yale Journal of International Law* 421, 425–426; Oona A Hathaway et al, ‘The Law of Cyber-Attack’ (2012) 100 *California Law Review* 817, 882; Kristen E Eichensehr, ‘The Cyber-Law of Nations’ (2015) 103 *Georgetown Law Journal* 317, 356; Michael N Schmitt and Liis Vihul, ‘The Nature of International Law Cyber Norms’ in Osula and Rõigas (n 16) 39.
- 23 See Richard A Clarke & Robert Knake, *Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It* (Harper Collins 2010) xi (‘The entire phenomenon of cyber war is shrouded in such government secrecy that it makes the Cold War look like a time of openness and transparency.’).
- 24 Notable exceptions include, e.g., US, The White House, *International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World* (2011); Harold Hongju Koh, ‘International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference’ (18 September 2012) <<http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/197924.htm>>.
- 25 Michael N Schmitt and Sean Watts, ‘The Decline of International Humanitarian Law *Opinio Juris* and the Law of Cyber Warfare’ (2015) 50 *Texas International Law Journal* 189, 211.
- 26 US, Department of Defense, Office of the General Counsel, *Law of War Manual* (2015) <http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/images/law_war_manual15.pdf>.
- 27 *Ibid* ch xvii.

unsettled issues, including standards of attribution, rules of targeting or the requirement to review cyber weapons.²⁸

While the first two indicators relate to states' reluctance to act in ways meaningful for the generation of new rules, the third concerns their actual conduct in relation to cyber governance. It would be inaccurate to claim that states have entirely given up on standard-setting. However, instead of interpreting or developing rules of international law, state representatives have sought refuge in the vacuous term 'norms'. We can see this trend most clearly in the context of the work of the UN GGE. In its latest report, the group touted the advantages of '[v]oluntary, *non-binding norms* of responsible state behaviour'.²⁹ The report claimed that such norms prevent conflict in cyberspace, foster international development, and reduce risks to international peace and security.³⁰ The report further recommended 11 such norms for consideration by states,³¹ while making it clear that these norms operate on a decidedly non-legal plane.³² Despite their minimalistic nature, the norms have thus far received very limited endorsement by their addressees. For example, at a US-China summit in September 2015, the two participating heads of state 'welcomed' the report but refrained from committing themselves to any of the proposed norms.³³

Together, these three indicators signify a trend of moving away from the creation of legal rules of international law in the classical sense. Instead of developing binding treaty or customary rules, states resort to normative activity outside the scope of traditional international law. Although this trend appears to be especially prominent in the area of cyber security, it is by no means limited to it. In legal theory, this phenomenon has been described as 'the pluralization of international norm-making',³⁴ characterised by the observation that 'only a limited part of the exercise of public authority at the international level nowadays materializes itself in the creation of norms which can be considered international legal rules according to a classical understanding of international law'.³⁵ In order to understand the impact this situation has on the international legal regulation of cyber security, we must zoom out slightly to take in the broader context of existing international law.

3. EXISTING LEGAL LANDSCAPE

The absence of a cyber-specific system of rules of international law does not mean that there are no legal rules that would apply to cyber activities. As we have seen, states accept that generally applicable rules of international law apply to states' conduct in cyberspace, too. This is undoubtedly correct. If international law is to be an efficient governance structure, it must be

²⁸ See further Sean Watts, 'Cyber Law Development and the United States Law of War Manual' in Osula and Rõigas (n 16).

²⁹ Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, UN Doc A/70/174 (22 July 2015) ('GGE Report 2015') 7 [10] (emphasis added).

³⁰ Ibid 7 [10].

³¹ Ibid 7–8 [13].

³² Ibid 7 [10].

³³ US, White House, 'Fact Sheet: President Xi Jinping's Visit to the United States' (25 September 2015) <<https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xi-jinpings-state-visit-united-states>>.

³⁴ Jean d'Aspremont, *Formalism and the Sources of International Law* (OUP 2011) 222.

³⁵ Ibid 2.

adaptable to new phenomena without the need to reinvent an entire regulation framework on each occasion.³⁶

By way of an example, the UN Charter was finalised when the invention of nuclear weapons was still a closely guarded secret and this instrument thus understandably did not refer to this type of weapons in its provisions on the use of force.³⁷ Still, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) had little difficulty in holding, in the *Nuclear Weapons* Advisory Opinion issued decades later, that those provisions ‘apply to any use of force, regardless of the weapons employed’,³⁸ notwithstanding the fact that a particular type of weapons might not yet have been generally known or even invented when the Charter was adopted. Following the same logic, cyber operations must equally be subject to the international law regulation of the use of force.³⁹

In addition to these generally applicable rules of international law, certain sectoral and regional treaties taken together provide a ‘patchwork of regulations’ for cyber activities.⁴⁰ These include, in particular, the 1992 Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union;⁴¹ the 2001 Budapest Convention on Cybercrime⁴² and its 2006 Protocol on Xenophobia and Racism;⁴³ the 2009 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s Information Security Agreement;⁴⁴ and the 2014 African Union’s Cyber Security Convention.⁴⁵ Although important in their own right, these international agreements govern only a small slice of cyber-related activities (such as criminal offences committed by means of computer systems⁴⁶ or operations interfering with existing telecommunications networks⁴⁷), or have a very limited membership (six states in the case of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s agreement⁴⁸ and none yet in that of the African Union’s convention⁴⁹).

Therefore, although cyberspace is certainly not a lawless territory beyond the reach of international law, for now there is no complex regulatory mechanism governing state cyber activities.⁵⁰ Moreover, states seem reluctant to engage themselves in the development and

³⁶ Cf US, *International Strategy for Cyberspace* (n 24) 9.

³⁷ Charter of the United Nations (signed 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS 16, Arts 2(4) and 39–51.

³⁸ ICJ, *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case* (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226 [39].

³⁹ Accord Michael N Schmitt (ed), *Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare* (CUP 2013) 42.

⁴⁰ Hathaway (n 22) 873.

⁴¹ Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union (concluded 22 December 1992, entered into force 1 July 1994) 1825 UNTS 143 (hereinafter ‘ITU Constitution’).

⁴² Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime (signed 23 November 2001, entered into force 1 July 2004) ETS 185.

⁴³ Council of Europe, Additional Protocol concerning the Criminalisation of Acts of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed through Computer Systems (opened for signature 28 January 2003, entered into force 1 March 2006) ETS 189.

⁴⁴ Agreement between the Governments of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation on Cooperation in the Field of International Information Security (signed 16 June 2009, entered into force 5 January 2012) (‘Yekaterinburg Agreement’).

⁴⁵ African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection (signed 27 June 2014) AU Doc EX.CL/846(XXV).

⁴⁶ Convention on Cybercrime (n 42) Arts 2–10.

⁴⁷ ITU Constitution (n 41) Art 45 (prohibiting harmful interference) and Annex (defining harmful interference).

⁴⁸ Yekaterinburg Agreement (n 44).

⁴⁹ See further Henry Rõigas, ‘Mixed Feedback on the “African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection”’, *CCD COE INCYDER Database* (20 February 2015) <<https://ccdcoe.org/mixed-feedback-african-union-convention-cyber-security-and-personal-data-protection.html>>.

⁵⁰ See also Hathaway (n 22) 873.

interpretation of international law applicable to cyber security. This voluntary retreat has generated a power vacuum, enabling non-state actors to move into the space vacated by states and pursue various forms of ‘norm entrepreneurship’.⁵¹

4. POWER VACUUM

Vectors of power and law do not overlap perfectly. State power is certainly influenced by many other factors, which may include military might, wealth, and moral authority.⁵² Nonetheless, it needs little emphasis that the powerful normally seek to use legal regulation to consolidate and project their power.⁵³ If we understand power simply as ‘the ability to alter others’ behaviour to produce preferred outcomes’,⁵⁴ then setting legal obligations is one way how to exercise this ability. Everything else being equal, it is more likely than not that these ‘others’ will act in accordance with a certain standard of behaviour when it is required by law than when it is not.

Yet, legal uncertainty may at times be deemed desirable by even the most powerful states. For example, during the early days of space exploration, only two states were capable of acting in outer space: the US and the Soviet Union. Yet these two states resisted, for a significant time, to commit themselves to any binding rules that would govern outer space. Both believed that the adoption of such rules would only serve to constrain their activities in space. In that vein, ‘[l]egal uncertainty was useful to those with the power to act in space, on either side of the cold war.’⁵⁵

However, cyberspace and outer space – albeit frequently lumped together as so-called ‘global commons’⁵⁶ – are decidedly different from one another. This is not only because many states are challenging the very idea of cyberspace as commons by seeking to assert greater control online.⁵⁷ More importantly, cyberspace is already a much more crowded domain than outer space could ever be. To wit, the US and the Soviet Union were not just the only *states* engaged in space exploration for several decades, they were also the only *actors* capable of space flight as such. In contrast, cyberspace is populated primarily by non-state actors, which include individuals, corporations, and other more loosely organised groups.⁵⁸ The possibility of anonymity online combined with the corresponding difficulty of attribution of cyber operations

51 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’ (1998) 52(4) *International Organization* 887.

52 Michael Byers, *Custom, Power and the Power of Rules* (CUP 1999) 5.

53 See further Rosalyn Higgins, *Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It* (Clarendon Press 1995) 3–4 (analysing the relationship between law and power from the perspective of international law).

54 Joseph Nye, *The Future of Power* (Public Affairs 2011) 10.

55 Stuart Banner, *Who Owns the Sky? The Struggle to Control Airspace from the Wright Brothers On* (Harvard University Press 2008) 278.

56 See, e.g., Mark Barrett et al, *Assured Access to the Global Commons* (NATO 2011) xii; Scott Jasper and Scott Moreland, ‘Introduction’ in Scott Jasper (ed), *Conflict and Cooperation in the Global Commons* (Georgetown University Press 2012) 21; Nicholas Tsagourias, ‘The Legal Status of Cyberspace’ in Nicholas Tsagourias & Russell Buchan, *Research Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace* (Edward Elgar 2015) 24–25; Paul Meyer, ‘Outer Space and Cyberspace: A Tale of Two Security Realms’ in Osula and Røigas (n 16) 157.

57 Scott Shackelford, *Managing Cyber Attacks in International Law, Business, and Relations* (CUP 2014) 58.

58 See further Johan Sigholm, ‘Non-State Actors in Cyberspace Operations’ (2013) 4(1) *Journal of Military Studies* 1, 9–23.

have resulted in the ‘dramatic amplification’ of power in the hands of these non-state actors at the expense of their state counterparts.⁵⁹

The effect of legal uncertainty is thus much more complex than what we saw in relation to outer space, as it affects a far more populous spectrum of actors, state and non-state alike. Accordingly, non-state actors have now moved into the vacated norm-creating territory previously occupied exclusively by states. These developments have been primarily driven by the private sector and by the academia, as epitomised by Microsoft’s cyber norms proposal and by the so-called *Tallinn Manual* project.

5. NON-STATE-DRIVEN INITIATIVES

The more recent of the two, Microsoft’s proposal entitled *International Cybersecurity Norms: Reducing Conflict in an Internet-Dependent World* was published in December 2014.⁶⁰ Interestingly, this was not the first private-sector initiative of this kind. Exactly 15 years earlier, Steve Case, then the CEO of AOL, urged states to revise their ‘country-centric’ laws and adopt instead ‘international standards’ governing crucial aspects of conduct online, including security, privacy, and taxation.⁶¹ Still, Microsoft’s text is the first comprehensive proposal of specific standards of behaviour online, which, despite its private origin, proposes norms purporting to regulate solely the conduct of states.⁶² The openly proclaimed central aim of this white paper was to reduce the possibility that ICT products and services would be ‘used, abused or exploited by nation states as part of military operations’.⁶³ To that end, the paper put forward six cyber security norms, which collectively called on states to improve their cyber defences and limit their engagement in offensive operations.⁶⁴

In 2013, an international group of experts led by Professor Michael Schmitt published the *Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare*.⁶⁵ Although the project was undertaken under the auspices of the Estonia-based NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE), the *Manual* makes it clear that its text should be seen as reflecting the views of the experts themselves and not the states or institutions from which they originated.⁶⁶ As apparent from its title, the *Manual* maintains a clear military paradigm throughout, focussing on the law on the use of force (*jus ad bellum*) and the law of armed conflict (*jus in bello*).⁶⁷ Its text identifies 95 rules adopted by consensus among the group of experts who

⁵⁹ Christian Czosseck, ‘State Actors and their Proxies in Cyberspace’ in Katharina Ziolkowski (ed), *Peacetime Regime for state Activities in Cyberspace* (NATO CCD COE 2013) 1–3.

⁶⁰ Angela McKay et al, *International Cybersecurity Norms: Reducing Conflict in an Internet-Dependent World* (Microsoft 2014) <<http://aka.ms/cybernorns>>.

⁶¹ Steve Case, ‘Remarks Prepared for Delivery (via satellite) Israel ’99 Business Conference’ (13 December 1999), cited in Jack Goldsmith and Timothy S Wu, *Who Controls the Internet?: Illusions of a Borderless World* (OUP 2006) 194.

⁶² McKay et al (n 60) 2–3.

⁶³ Suzanne Honey, ‘6 Proposed Cybersecurity Norms Could Reduce Conflict’, *Microsoft: The Fire Hose* (5 December 2014) <<https://blogs.microsoft.com/firehose/2014/12/05/6-proposed-cybersecurity-norms-could-reduce-conflict>>.

⁶⁴ McKay et al (n 60) 2. The complete list of the proposed norms may be found in the annex to the document: *ibid* 20.

⁶⁵ *Tallinn Manual* (n 39).

⁶⁶ *Ibid* 11.

⁶⁷ *Ibid* 5.

were guided by the ambition to ‘replicate customary international law’.⁶⁸ Early reviews of the *Manual* criticised its almost exclusive focus on activities occurring above the level of the use of force, whereas in reality, most (if not all) cyber operations fall below that threshold.⁶⁹ However, the ongoing ‘*Tallinn 2.0*’ project, scheduled for completion in 2016, should dispel some of these objections by turning its attention to ‘below-the-threshold’ operations and by addressing issues of state responsibility, the law of the sea, international telecommunications law, and even human rights law.⁷⁰ Like the Microsoft paper, both iterations of the *Tallinn Manual* project put forward standards of state behaviour and are avowedly state-centric in their approach.

Understandably, the two initiatives differ in important ways. The ‘norms’ proposed by Microsoft are clearly meant as broad suggestions only, meaning that states need to transform them into more specific commitments. For instance, norm 2 stipulates that ‘states should have a clear principle-based policy for handling product and service vulnerabilities that reflects a strong mandate to report them to vendors rather than to stockpile, buy, sell, or exploit them’.⁷¹ As recognised in the paper itself, such policies need to be developed by each individual state and tailored to the needs of the concerned state.⁷²

By contrast, the *Tallinn Manual* ‘rules’ take on the more restrictive and specific form of purported customary legal obligations, which should simply be observed by states as binding without the need for their further endorsement or adaptation.⁷³ In other words, the *Manual* aims to interpret how ‘extant legal norms’ apply to conduct in cyberspace,⁷⁴ and not to ‘set forth *lex ferenda*’.⁷⁵ Yet, given that the *Manual* frequently puts forward detailed and novel positions, it does not always succeed in maintaining a bright line between norm interpretation and norm development.⁷⁶ Nevertheless, the purported rules it contains are much more specific than Microsoft’s cybersecurity norms. For example, rule 37 sets out the prohibition of cyber attacks against civilian objects in the context of an armed conflict.⁷⁷ Both crucial terms – ‘cyber attacks’ as well as ‘civilian objects’ – are precisely defined by the *Manual*.⁷⁸ Although some disagreements may persist about the application of the rule in particular circumstances,⁷⁹ the content of the norm is sufficiently clear and precise to generate legal rights and obligations.

However, what initiatives like Microsoft’s white paper or the *Tallinn Manual* project share is their non-state origin and expressly non-binding nature. Microsoft was keenly aware of its proposal’s

⁶⁸ Ibid 6.

⁶⁹ See, e.g., Dieter Fleck, ‘Searching for International Rules Applicable to Cyber Warfare: A Critical First Assessment of the New Tallinn Manual’ (2013) 18(2) *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* 331, 332–335; Eichensehr (n 22) 589.

⁷⁰ See ‘Tallinn Manual’, NATO CCD COE (undated) <<https://ccdcoe.org/research.html>>.

⁷¹ McKay et al (n 60) 12.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ *Tallinn Manual* (n 39) 6.

⁷⁴ Ibid 1.

⁷⁵ Ibid 5.

⁷⁶ See further Kubo Mačák, ‘Military Objectives 2.0: The Case for Interpreting Computer Data as Objects under International Humanitarian Law’ (2015) 48(1) *Israel Law Review* 55, 59–63 (discussing the distinction between *lex lata* and *lex ferenda* in the *Tallinn Manual*).

⁷⁷ *Tallinn Manual* (n 39) 124.

⁷⁸ Ibid 91 (definition of cyber attack) and 125 [3] (definition of civilian objects).

⁷⁹ See, e.g., the debate whether computer data may constitute an ‘object’ for the purposes of international humanitarian law: Heather A Harrison Dinniss, ‘The Nature of Objects: Targeting Networks and the Challenge of Defining Cyber Military Objectives’ (2015) 48(1) *Israel Law Review* 39; Mačák (n 76); Michael N Schmitt, ‘The Notion of ‘Objects’ during Cyber Operations: A Riposte in Defence of Interpretive and Applicative Precision’ (2015) 48(1) *Israel Law Review* 81.

limitations in this respect and noted that it merely ‘encouraged’ states to set the proposed norms on the trajectory towards making them first ‘politically’ and then ‘legally’ binding.⁸⁰ Similarly, the *Manual* noted in its opening pages that it was meant to be ‘a non-binding document’.⁸¹ As the texts in question are in their entirety the products of non-state initiatives, they could hardly amount to anything else. After all, with potential minor qualifications in the area of collective security, it is still true that only ‘the states are the legislators of the international legal system’.⁸²

If these texts are non-binding, one might question their relevance from the perspective of international law altogether. True, their normativity (in the sense of the strength of their claim to authority⁸³) is lower than that of international legal rules. But that does not mean that these efforts are wholly irrelevant for the formation of rules of international law, and even less do they document any supposed irrelevance of international law to the area of cyber security. On the contrary, non-state-driven initiatives of this kind potentially amount to ‘a vital intermediate stage towards a more rigorously binding system, permitting experiment and rapid modification’.⁸⁴ Moreover, they render the law-making process more multilateral and inclusive than the traditional state-driven norm-making can ever be.⁸⁵ Therefore, the crucial question is whether states decide to pick up the gauntlet thrown at them by their non-state counterparts and reclaim their role as principal lawmakers.

6. STATES AT A CRITICAL JUNCTURE

The current situation is certainly not without prior historical parallels. Cyberspace is not the first novel phenomenon to have resisted the development of global governance structures for some time after its emergence. A degree of waiting or stalling may even reflect states’ desire to obtain a better understanding of the new phenomenon’s strategic potential.⁸⁶ Yet with states’ improved comprehension of the new situation, their willingness to subject themselves to binding rules usually increases, too. Even the domain of outer space has been eventually subjected to a binding legal regime,⁸⁷ despite the strong initial reluctance of the dominant spacefaring states.⁸⁸

Other domains with a higher number of participants may provide more appropriate analogies. For instance, in the context of Antarctica, many non-binding norms were put forward in the 1960s and 1970s with the aim to conserve living and non-living resources of the Antarctic

⁸⁰ McKay et al (n 60) 3.

⁸¹ *Tallinn Manual* (n 39) 1.

⁸² Stefan Talmon, ‘The Security Council as World Legislature’ (2005) 99 AJIL 175, 175. As the title of Professor Talmon’s article suggests, the qualification to that general observation arises from the Security Council’s recent practice of adopting resolutions containing obligations of general and abstract character.

⁸³ Samantha Besson, ‘Theorizing the Sources of International Law’ in Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas (eds), *The Philosophy of International Law* (OUP 2010) 173.

⁸⁴ Hugh Thirlway, *The Sources of International Law* (OUP 2014) 164, paraphrasing Mary E O’Connell, ‘The Role of Soft law in a Global Order’ in Dinah Shelton (ed), *Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System* (OUP 2000) 100.

⁸⁵ Besson (n 83) 170–171.

⁸⁶ Cf Patrick W Franzese, ‘Sovereignty in Cyberspace: Can It Exist?’ (2009) 64 Air Force Law Review 1, 38; Schmitt and Vihul (n 22) 38.

⁸⁷ See, principally, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 610 UNTS 205 (opened for signature 27 January 1967, entered into force 10 October 1967) (‘Outer Space Treaty’).

⁸⁸ See text to n 55 above.

environment.⁸⁹ These norms gradually evolved into the 1991 Antarctic Environmental Protection Protocol, a complex binding instrument that has since been ratified by all key stakeholders.⁹⁰

Similarly, it took over three decades since the 1954 launch of the first nuclear power plant in the world in Obninsk, Soviet Union,⁹¹ until the first international conventions on nuclear safety were adopted.⁹² In the meantime, states were guided by non-binding safety standards and criteria, most of which were issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).⁹³ Afterwards, nuclear safety conventions consolidated this emerging body of non-binding norms and made many of the relevant standards mandatory for all member states.⁹⁴

As these examples demonstrate, instead of lamenting over a supposed crisis of international law, it is more appropriate to view the current situation as an intermediate stage on the way towards the generation of cyber 'hard law'. Non-state-driven initiatives provide opportunities for states to identify overlaps with their strategic interests and they may serve as norm-making laboratories. Their usefulness in this sense is confirmed by a recent report of the EastWest Institute, which helpfully maps out areas of convergence across various proposals of norms of state behaviour in cyberspace including those analysed in this paper.⁹⁵

A final point to consider is the so-called attribution problem (understood as the difficulty in determining the identity or location of a cyber attacker or their intermediary⁹⁶). For some time, it was rightly seen as an impediment to the development of effective legal regulation of cyber activities. It was argued that the prevailing anonymity online 'makes it difficult – if not impossible – for rules on either cybercrime or cyberwar to regulate or deter.'⁹⁷ However, recent technological progress has translated into increased confidence of states with respect to attribution of cyber activities. For instance, the US has claimed that it now has the capacity

⁸⁹ Christopher C Joyner, 'The Legal Status and Effect of Antarctic Recommended Measures' in Dinah Shelton (ed), *Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-binding Norms in the International Legal System* (OUP 2003) 175–176.

⁹⁰ Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (signed 1991, entered into force 14 January 1998) 30 ILM 1455.

⁹¹ Paul R Josephson, *Red Atom: Russia's Nuclear Power Program from Stalin to Today* (University of Pittsburgh Press 2005) 2.

⁹² Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (adopted 26 September 1986, entered into force 27 October 1986) 1439 UNTS 275; Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (adopted 26 September 1986, entered into force 26 February 1987) 1457 UNTS 133. Two additional conventions were adopted in the 1990s: Convention on Nuclear Safety (done 20 September 1994, entered into force 24 October 1996) 1963 UNTS 293; Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (signed 29 September 1997, entered into force 18 June 2001) (1997) 36 ILM 1436.

⁹³ For an overview of these standards, see IAEA, 'Measures to Strengthen International Co-operation in Nuclear, Radiation, Transport and Waste Safety', IAEA Doc GC(45)/INF/3, Attachment 2 (31 August 2001) 1–7.

⁹⁴ See further Norbert Pelzer, 'Learning the Hard Way: Did the Lessons Taught by the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident Contribute to Improving Nuclear Law?' in the Joint Report by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency, *International Nuclear Law in the Post-Chernobyl Period* (OECD 2006) 86–88.

⁹⁵ Greg Austin, Bruce McConnell, and Jan Neutze, 'Promoting International Cyber Norms: A New Advocacy Forum' (EastWest Institute, December 2015) <<http://issuu.com/ewipublications/docs/bgcybernorns>> 10–17.

⁹⁶ David A Wheeler and Gregory N Larsen, 'Techniques for Cyber Attack Attribution' (Institute for Defense Analysis 2003) 1.

⁹⁷ Duncan B Hollis, 'An e-SOS for Cyberspace' (2011) 52(2) *Harvard International Law Journal* 374, 378.

to locate its cyber adversaries and hold them accountable.⁹⁸ In a similar statement, Canada noted that it has robust systems in place allowing it to localise cyber intrusions, including those orchestrated by state-sponsored actors.⁹⁹ Significant progress has also been made in the understanding of the legal standards of attribution as applied to online conduct.¹⁰⁰ Although it is probably correct that the attribution problem can at most be managed but not solved,¹⁰¹ these developments show that time may be ripe for states to endorse the regulatory and deterrent potential of international legal rules.

Building on the emerging normative convergence identified above, states should be able to reclaim their central role in international law-making. In the more immediate future, they should become more forthcoming in expressing their opinion as to the interpretation of existing international law to cyber issues.¹⁰² This will in time enable the applicable *opinio juris* to consolidate, thus facilitating the process of transformation of state power into obligations of customary law.¹⁰³ Additionally, states should gradually overcome their current aversion to treaty commitments. Reports from late 2015 that the US and China started negotiating a binding arms control treaty for cyberspace are possible early signs that this process is already underway.¹⁰⁴ Finally, this iterative process of state-appropriated norm-making could in the long run quite plausibly result in the adoption of one or several comprehensive multilateral undertakings, possibly commencing with definitional matters to pave the way towards future consensus-building over more substantive issues.¹⁰⁵

7. CONCLUSION

International law of cyber security is at a critical juncture today. It is true that states' hesitation to engage in the development and application of international law has generated a power vacuum allowing for the emergence of non-state norm-making initiatives. Still, it would be premature to speak of a situation of crisis.

Several historical parallels show that a mixture of initial soft-law approaches combined with a growing set of binding rules can provide a logical and functioning response to a novel

⁹⁸ Zachary Fryer-Biggs, 'DoD's New Cyber Doctrine: Panetta Defines Deterrence, Preemption Strategy', *Defense News* (13 October 2012) <http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20121013/DEFREG02/310130001/DoD-8217-s-New-Cyber-Doctrine>" <http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20121013/DEFREG02/310130001/DoD-8217-s-New-Cyber-Doctrine>.

⁹⁹ Canada, Statement by the Chief Information Officer for the Government of Canada (29 July 2014) <<http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=871449>>.

¹⁰⁰ See, e.g., Nicholas Tsagourias, 'Cyber Attacks, Self-Defence and the Problem of Attribution' (2012) 17(2) *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* 229; Zhixiong Huang, 'The Attribution Rules in ILC's Articles on State Responsibility: A Preliminary Assessment on Their Application to Cyber Operations' (2015) 14 *Baltic Yearbook of International Law* 41.

¹⁰¹ Thomas Rid and Ben Buchanan, 'Attributing Cyber Attacks' (2014) 38 *Journal of Strategic Studies* 1, 28.

¹⁰² For other similar calls on states to be more proactive in expressing their cyber-specific *opinio juris*, see, e.g., Katharina Ziolkowski, 'General Principles of International Law as Applicable in Cyberspace' in Ziolkowski (n 59) 175; Schmitt and Vihul (n 22) 47; Schmitt and Watts (n 25) 230–231.

¹⁰³ Cf Byers (n 52) 18.

¹⁰⁴ David E Sanger, 'U.S. and China Seek Arms Deal for Cyberspace', *New York Times* (19 September 2015) <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/20/world/asia/us-and-china-seek-arms-deal-for-cyberspace.html?_r=0>.

¹⁰⁵ See, e.g., Hathaway (n 22) 877.

phenomenon. In the 21st century, pluralisation of norm-making processes involving diverse state and non-state actors is a common feature at the international level and it need not be feared as such.¹⁰⁶

What matters is whether, and to what extent, states will reclaim their traditional central legislative role. Their conduct in the next few years will determine whether we will observe a gradual demise of inter-State governance of cyberspace or a fundamental recalibration of legal approaches with states taking centre stage once again. If they want to ensure that the existing power vacuum is not exploited in a way that might upset their ability to achieve their strategic and political goals, states should certainly not hesitate too long.

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¹⁰⁶ See d'Aspremont (n 34) 2–3.